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COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND PARENT
RIGHTS: A JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF
ANALYSIS
In recent years violations of state compulsory education laws
have risen dramatically.' Parents are increasingly choosing types of
schooling for their children that are outside those alternatives 2 ap-
proved by state statute. 3 These parents find public schools and
approved private schools too conservative, too liberal, or simply not
academically rigorous enough. 4 Resolving the conflict between par-
ents' interests in controlling the upbringing of their children and a
state's interest in enforcing its compulsory education laws is difficult
because each interest is significant and is grounded in the United
States Constitution.' Parents' rights to determine their children's
education are grounded in the first. amendment, which protects the
free exercise of religion, as well as the fourteenth amendment,
which protects liberty and the right of privacy.' These rights may
conflict with the state interest, as accepted by the United States
Supreme Court, of ensuring the education of all the children to
prepare them to become "self-reliant and self-sufficient citizens."'
This interest, grounded in the tenth amendment grant of police
power, is manifest in compulsory education laws, which require
1 Lines, Private Education Alternatives and Stale Regulation, 123.L. & Euuc. 189, 189 (1983).
2 Fur the purposes of this article, "alternatives" refers to schooling that is not approved
by the state.
11
	 supra ru le 1, at 191. For example, "[t]he Bureau of the Census estimates that
enrollment in non-Catholic, nonpublic schools increased from 615,540 to 1,433,000 between
1965 and 1975. It seems likely that the largest growth is in attendance at unapproved schools.
In contrast, public school population has declined from approximately 45.900,000 in 1970
to 42,600,000 in 1978." Id.
4 /d. at 190
5 Although children may have their own constitutional claims, this note will not discuss
the claims children themselves may bring. For such a discussion, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoisirrrtrrioNAL LAW 856, 882-83 (1978); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Further, this note will no discuss claims based on particular
state constitutions, but will Inuit discussion to claims that rely on the Federal Constitution.
6 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (first amendment free exercise clause); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S, 510, 534-35 (1925) (fourteenth amendment liberty clause). Cases in
which alternative schools have brought suits with parents often have included claims
grounded in the establishment clause. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East
Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (1). Mass. 1987) (first amendment free exercise and estab-
lishment issues were raised). This note focuses primarily on parents' rights and therefore
will not discuss the establishment clause directly.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
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students to attend schools and which regulate the schools that stu-
dents attend. 8
The significance of the interests involved in this conflict makes
reconciliation difficult. Courts are currently unsure whether to re-
solve the conflict by balancing the interests involved, or by applying
the recent Supreme Court "strict scrutiny" analysis. Unfortunately,
the 1971 decision of Wisconsin v. Yoder is the most recent Supreme
Court case to touch directly on this conflict; the Court in Yoder chose
to balance the interests involved." The Yoder Court recognized the
importance of both the state and parental interests in its decision
to exempt Amish children from the last two years of compulsory
education required by statute.'" Amish parents claimed that requir-
ing their children to attend school after the eighth grade infringed
upon their religious beliefs and forced them to chose between vio-
lating the law or following their religion." The Court balanced the
parents' first amendment right to guide their children's religious
education with the state interest in ensuring the education of all the
children. t2
Since that decision the Supreme Court has changed its general
framework of analysis of the first and fourteenth amendments from
a balancing of rights or interests to a strict scrutiny framework.' 3
Today, for example, the Court examines state infringements upon
religious rights protected by the first amendment under a strict
scrutiny framework.' 4 Thus, the Court might analogously apply
strict scrutiny to compulsory education cases that rest on the first
amendment, and abandon the balancing analysis used in Yoder.
Compulsory education cases resting on the fourteenth amend-
ment might also be analyzed with a strict scrutiny framework. The
Supreme Court now applies strict scrutiny to state infringements
on fundamental rights.' 5 Although the Supreme Court has not had
" See generally Lines, supra note 1, at 194.
406 U.S. at 235.
14 Id. at 213.
Id, at 209.
' 5 Id. at 231-36.
13 See J. Nowax, R. ROTUNDA & j, Youmt, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448, 457, 1061-63 (2d
ed. 1983). Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court gives added protection to
certain rights contained in the fourteenth and first amendments. Id. Rights which are essential
to accepted views of individual liberty justify strict scrutiny. See id. at 448, 457.
'' See, e.g., Hubbie, 107 S. C.t. at 1049 (strict scrutiny applies to free exercise clause of the
first amendment).
15 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (strict scrutiny applied to the fundamental
privacy right, a mother's right to abort a fetus).
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the opportunity to declare parents' rights to guide the education of
their children fundamental under its current analysis, early Court
decisions found such rights to be essential. Moreover, recently the
Court has stated in dicta that the right is fundamental.' 6 The Court
has also relied on this parental right to help substantiate other rights
that it has held fundamental.' 7 .Thus, parents' right to guide the
education of their children may be fundamental. If the Court held
the right to be fundamental, and found that state action infringed
upon that right, the Court would apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court will permit state
action which infringes on the first or the fourteenth amendments
only if a state's actions are the least restrictive means to achieving a
compelling state interest. Thus, if educating children is a compelling
state interest, the state may regulate education despite infringing
on parents' rights if the regulations are proven to be essential.
Although the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to find
the state interest in education compelling, it has made clear that
this interest is crucial to society. Therefore, the state interest in
education is probably compelling.'B
Because the Supreme Court has not yet applied strict scrutiny
to compulsory education cases, courts are now unsure whether to
analyze education conflicts within the new "strict scrutiny" frame-
work or to follow the balancing framework used in Yoder. 19 The
result has been a patchwork of different analyses, as evidenced in
the recent Massachusetts cases, Care and Protection of Charles 2" and
New Life Baptist Church v. East Longmeadow. 2 ' In Charles, the Massa-
}'m Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
'I See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977). The Court held that
a housing ordinance violated the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. M. In particular, the Court held that the ordinance violated the appellant's right
to live with her extended family. Id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (the Court recognized a fundamental right to privacy among married couples in
regard to their use of contraception).
IS See generally id. For the purposes of discussion of strict scrutiny, and because of the
importance with which the Court holds the state interest, this note will assume that the
interest would be held compelling.
19 This confusion is manifested by different courts applying different frameworks of
analysis. See, e.g., Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987)
(court confronted with first and fourteenth amendment claims primarily applied a balancing
test); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (1). Mass.
1987) (court applied strict scrutiny to first amendment claims); State v. Whistler, 47 Ohio St.
2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) (court applied strict scrutiny to first and fourteenth amend-
ment claims).
'2(' 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987).
21 666 F. Supp. 293 (I), Mass. 1987).
864	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:861
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with both four-
teenth and first amendment claims and applied the balancing
framework employed in Yoder. 22 The court upheld a school com-
mittee's decision to forbid home schooling to a particular family,
ruling that the compulsory education statute was constitutional as
applied. 23 In contrast, the Massachusetts federal district court in
New Life applied the strict scrutiny framework to a first amendment
free exercise claim and enjoined a school committee from applying
its particular approval process to an unapproved private religious
school. 24 Although the parents' claims were similar, both courts
analyzed the Massachusetts statute with different general frame-
works and reached different results.
If a court applies strict scrutiny analysis, it must define exactly
what the state's interest in education involves, and whether the
state's regulatory scheme is the .least restrictive means of achieving
this interest; unfortunately, this is no easy chore. The Supreme
Court has accepted the view that the state has an interest in ensuring
the education of all children." According to the Court, the purpose
behind education is to prepare citizens to "participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system" and to prepare "in-
dividuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in sod-
ety." 28 Although the degree of education that will satisfy this pur-
pose is unclear, the Court did accept Thomas Jefferson's notion
that the state interest would be satisfied by a "basic" education.
Thus, the Court has held that basic education entails the "three
k's," but has gone into no further detail. 27
Litigants representing states have argued that this state interest
in education ought to be expanded from the notion of "basic"
education to something more substantial due to the sophisticated
demands of the modern job market. 28 Further, proponents of a
broader state interest have argued that children must be provided
the necessary reasoning skills to be able to question their religious
faith. 29 The Supreme Court, to date, has not extended the state
interest beyond ensuring that children receive a basic education."
12 399 Mass. at 336, 504 N.E.2d at 599.
23
	 at '337, 504 N.E.2d at 600.
24 666 F. Supp. at 319-20. The parents and school also raised establishment clause issues.
Id. at 322-25. This note will not discuss these issues.
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
56 Id.
2 7 Id. at 226, 226 n.14.
w See, e.g., New Life, 666 F. Stipp. at 318; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 232.
29 See, e.g., New Life, 666 F. Stipp. at 318; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 232.
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221, 232-33.
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The lack of specificity as to what constitutes a "basic" education
coupled with the effects of a complex, growing society ensure that
claims brought to define and extend this interest will continue.
This note discusses the fraMework of analysis courts have ap-
plied to the conflict between parents' rights to guide the educational
upbringing of their children and the state's interest in compulsory
education, suggesting that because parents' rights are within the
first amendment and ought to be within the fourteenth amendment,
strict scrutiny analysis is the correct framework to apply. Section 1
analyzes the basis and history of the state interest in education,
noting how states, Massachusetts in particular, have enacted laws to
further this interest." Section II focuses on the reasons for parental
dissatisfaction with state approved education. This section discusses
the constitutional rationales and analytical frameworks the Supreme
Court has accepted and Wright accept for recognizing parents' rights
to guide the education of their chilcIren. 32 Section III examines two
recent Massachusetts cases in which the courts applied different
frameworks to resolve compulsory education conflicts." This section
analyzes the problems that result when courts apply different
frameworks to this conflict."
This note suggests that parents' rights to guide the education
of their children are fundamental rights protected by both the first
and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Thus, courts
should apply to all compulsory educational conflicts, whether the
first or fourteenth amendment is implicated, the strict scrutiny
framework that the Supreme Court has applied to fundamental
rights. This framework of analysis properly recognizes the impor-
tance of the parents' fundamental rights as well as states' compelling
interest. Furthermore, this note suggests that the state interest in
education is correctly limited to ensuring that all children are ed-
ucated in the basics. Only after the state has been able to ensure
that such an interest is met ought courts even to consider enlarging
such a basic interest.
I. STATE INTEREST IN COMPULSORY EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has accepted the notion that state govern-
ments have an interest in providing a "basic" education for all
Sec infra notes 35-105 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 106-217 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 218-259 and accompanying text.
34 Id.
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children." The Court has never explicated what is required to
provide such a basic education other than reading, writing, and
arithmetic." Recently, litigants have urged a broadening of the state
interest to include more than "basic" education. 37 They have argued
that as times have changed, the ability to be independent and to
function successfully in society requires more than the basics. 38 To
analyze these differing views of the state's interest in education, one
needs to understand the roots and modern definition of this inter-
est.
A. The History of Compulsory Education Laws
The history of compulsory education laws manifests the varied
motives of such laws' proponents." Many historians believe that
compulsory education laws grew out of the English "Poor Laws" of
1563 and 1601. 4° These laws provided for a nation wide system of
apprenticeship by requiring the poor or unemployed to participate
in a seven year compulsory service.'" Such laws established the state's
involvement in family life, children, and education, an involvement
that would shape American educational legislation for the next 300
years.42 This view of the origin of compulsory education rests pri-
marily on the belief that such laws were aimed at helping individuals
become economically independent and at instilling moral values,43
Lawmakers attempted to address the economic and social problems
plaguing the lower classes; these laws did not apply to the upper'or
middle classes.'"
A more cynical view is that compulsory education grew out of
lawmakers' desire to indoctrinate and inculcate obedience. 45 Pro-
" Wisconsin v, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
sn /d. at 221, 226 n.14.
37 See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293,
305, 307 (0, Mass. 1987).
" /d. at 318 n.15.
39 What follows in the text are two of the primary theories that explicate the state interest
in education. For other views, see generally D. KIRP & M. YUDOE, EDUCATION POLICY AND
THE LAW 1-8 (1984).
40 L. KOTIN & W. AIRMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATION OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 9
(1980) [hereinafter Ko-riN[.
4 1
 Id. at 9.
'" Id. at 10.
49
44 1d. at 11.
45 RoTlittARD, Historical OFigin4, in THE TWELVE-YEAR SENTENCE 11-12 (W. Rickenbacker
ed. 1974).
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ponents of this view regard the Protestant Reformation as the foun-
dation of compulsory education. Martin Luther's influence helped
create compulsory attendance laws as early as 1524 in the German
state of Gotha. John Calvin, another influential voice in education,
felt the major object of education was to suppress dissent and in-
culcate obedience. Thus, it is not surprising that Calvinist Puritans
were the first to establish compulsory education and public schools
in America." It may well have been both a desire for individuals to
participate successfully in society and a need to inculcate obedience
and societal values which led this country to adopt compulsory
education laws. 47
The leading Puritan colony of Massachusetts Bay enacted the
first American compulsory education law in 1642. 48 Unlike the
"Poor Laws" in England, this law required all parents and masters
to provide an education in a trade and in reading to all children,
not merely the poor ones, and. contained an elaborate system of
penalties. 4  This act became the model for all subsequent educa-
tional legislation in New England.'"
The first legislation providing for the creation of public schools
and teachers was also in Massachusetts and was known as "The Old
Deluder Satan Act."' This legislation provided taxes from the gen-
eral populace to set up schools and pay teachers. 52 The southern
colonies, however, did not follow Massachusetts' lead and instead
adopted laws for the poor that resembled the apprenticeship model
of the English "Poor Laws." 53
Interest in compulsory education waned at the closing of the
17th century. This lack of interest continued until after the Amer-
ican Revolution. Frontier conditions, the need for child labor, and
the decline of religious fervor all contributed to this decline."
After the decline, however, Massachusetts again emerged at the
forefront of public education. 55 In 1789 Massachusetts enacted the
" Id. at 11-13,
' 7 The Supreme Court has accepted both views. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
221 (1072)..
' KOTIN, supra note 40, at 11 (citing Records of the Governor and Company of Massa-
chusetts Bay in New England 6-7 ( June 14, 1642)),
w Id. at 14.
51 Id. at 17-18. The Act was named because of a fear of Satan, who allegedly used
ignorance to keep people from knowledge of the Bible. Id, at 18.
62 I d.
° Id. at 20.
ro Id, at 20-23.
55 1d, at 24.
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first state-wide school law that established guidelines for the creation
of schools and established a school district system.`'[' The Massachu-
setts School Attendance Act of 1852 represented the first general
compulsory attendance law established in America." The statute
required adults responsible for children between the ages of eight
and fourteen to send such children to school for twelve weeks
annually, six weeks of which had to be consecutive. 58 By 1900,
perhaps reacting to the tremendous influx of immigrants, over
thirty states enacted similar statutes, which required school attend-
ance for a specified period of time per year for all children within
specified age groups. 59 Southern states followed this trend during
the years 1900 to 1918, though not until 1983 did all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have such laws."
Numerous factors account for the importance of compulsory
education in America." The influx of immigrants at various times
in our history may have increased states' desire to have a system to
aid in assimilating and introducing American values. 62 Also, the
desire to give all children the chance to participate successfully in
society, both socially and economically, played a part in the move
to compel children to go to school.°
The Supreme Court has held that the state interest in effec-
tuating either or both of these goals is of "supreme importance,"
and states should diligently promote them." As society became
increasingly complex, the Court recognized that the state interest
in education became more important. 65 In 1954 the Supreme Court
acknowledged the importance of the state interest, stating that pro-
56 Id. The statute required towns of fifty families to support an "English School" at least
six months a year, towns of 100 families to operate such a school all year long, and towns of
150 families to support a year round school and a grammar school that met for six months.
Id.
" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 24, §,§ 1, 2, 4 (1852).
sx Id.
KOTIN. supra note 40, at 25-26.
60 Id. at 26. Mississippi was the last state in require attendance. The state repealed
attendance laws following forced desegregation in the 1950s. See Lines, supra note 1, at 197. -
"' See KIRP & YUDOF, supra note 39.
62 RUN -MAIM, supra note 45, at-27-28.
"3 KoTiN, supra note 40, at 26.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (Court noted importance of the state
interest while holding unconstitutional a state law that forbade the teaching, in any private
or public school, of any modern language other than English to any child who had not
passed the eighth grade).
65 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (the Court recognized the
importance of education to all children in its decision that laws requiring or permitting
segregation of public schools were unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment).
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viding education was "perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments." 66 The Supreme Court combined the diver-
gent. views described above, and defined the goals of compulsory
education in terms of inculcating obedience and values, and pro-
viding children with a chance to succeed socially and economically
in society. Thus, a desire both to inculcate obedience and to foster
the social and economic development of the poor were instrumental
in the creation of compulsory education laws.
B. Current Compulsory Education Laws
All states, and the District of Columbia, have enacted statutes
that require children within certain ages to attend some form of
approved educational program.° These statutes usually provide
punitive action against the children and the parents of children who
do not attend an approved educational alternative, but not against
those who run unapproved private schools.°8 Although it is hard to
generalize about all these statutes, they do contain some common
threads.
All state statutes allow parents to send their children to private
schools. 69 In addition, all state statutes provide an exception to
mandatory school attendance for some form of home schooling.'"
Some statutes allow local school committees, school boards, or su-
perintendents to have the power to approve home instruction or
private school."' Other state statutes leave such authority to state-
level boards of education or state superintendents. 72 For example,
in Nevada, the state board of education is responsible for approving
private schools and home schooling," whereas in West Virginia the
66 Id. al 493.
Lines, supra note 1, at 194,
"' Id. Lines notes that "ltlhe law almost always provides for fines and jail sentences for
parents who fail to comply, and often truancy charges and possible institutionalization of the
child." Id.
" See generally id. at 199-95.
7" Lines, An Overview of flame Instruction , 68 Put DELTA KAPPAN 514 (March 1987) [here-
inafter Lines, Overview]. Lines stated that "[b]y the end of 1986 ... every state permitted
home instruction in some form." There is a trend toward liberalization, evidenced by the
fact that in 1983 only about half the states permitted instruction at home by the parent.
Lines, supra note I, at 197. Moreover, states that permit home instruction have consistently
moved in the direction of relaxing regulations. Lines, Overview, supra, at 514.
7 ' See generally Lines, supra note 1, at 194-95.
7' See generally id,
" NEV. REV, STAT. 1, 392.070 (1986).
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county board of education is responsible for making preliminary
decisions for both private and home schooling. 74
Despite these similarities, statutory requirements vary widely
among states. 75 Some states have few statutory requirements. 7" For
example, New jersey provides a broad exception to the compulsory
education requirement. 77 Parents in New Jersey must' send their
children to public school or a private school that affords them
instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools or
"equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school." 78
At the other end of the spectrum are such states as North
Dakota and West Virginia, which have several statutory require-
ments. 79 In North Dakota a private school must be approved by the
county superintendent, who must insure that children attend for
"the same length of time" as in public school, that the teachers are
legally certified, that the subjects offered meet state requirements,
and that the school complies with all health, fire, and safety laws. 8°
The West Virginia statute also contains extensive requirements. To
be approved in West Virginia, a private school must teach for a
specified length of time per year, teach specified subjects, keep
records of progress and attendance, supply a curriculum, have
students take regular standardized tests, and require teachers either
to achieve a score on the National Teachers Examination sufficient
for teacher certification or to have a high school diploma and at
least four years more formal education than the most academically
advanced child taught.'" Thus, there are marked differences in the
stringency of statutes.
The Supreme Court accepted the states' general power to en-
force compulsory attendance laws as early as the 1920s. 82 The Court
recognized that states' authority to enact and enforce compulsory
education statutes derives primarily from the tenth amendment to
74 W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (Supp. 1987).
75 Lines, supra note 1, at 194.
7" Id. at 195; see, e,g,, HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-8,9 (1985) (specified age, amount of days
of study); IND. CODE § 20-8.1.3-17 (Supp. 1987) (specified age, amount of days of study, and
taught in the English language); N.J. STAT. ANN. § I8A:38-25 (1968) (specified age, equivalent
instruction).
77
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1968).
78 Id.
79
 N.D. CENT. CoDE § 15-34.1-01, 15-34.1-03 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-I (Supp.
1987).
8" N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01, 15-34.1-03 (Supp. 1987).
4 ' W. VA. CODE § 18.8-1 (Supp. 1987).
es
	 e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
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the Constitution.'" The Supreme Court has held that the amend-
ment protects the states' authority to regulate their citizens' health
and salety." 4 The Court has maintained that, compelling children to
attend school falls within these bounds." Thus, states possess a
general constitutional right to enact such statutes.'"
Although the Court has found the general right to enact com-
pulsory education statutes to be constitutional, a particular statute
may use language so broad that it may be unconstitutionally vague. 87
For example, statutory language used in many states calls for alter-
native education to be "equivalent" to public school education."
The use of the broad notion of "equivalency" may leave too much
discretion to the state, making the statute too broad and unconsti-
tutional on its face." Although the Supreme Court has not had
before it a compulsory education case in which it determined that
the statute was too vague, numerous state courts have confronted
this issue.`'1 °
Currently, eighteen states have statutes that call for instruction
in alternative schools to be equivalent, comparable, or similar to the
instruction offered in public school."' Many of these statutes have
"3 Id. The pertinent part of the tenth amendment. reads "the powers not delegated to
the United Slates, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. The Supreme Court stated that "Mlle power of the State to compel attendance
at some school and to make reasonable regulation for all schools, , .. is not questioned."
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
" See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873). In upholding a state
statute, the Court recognized that states possess a "police power." Id. al 63. The Court. stated
that, although 'incapable of any very exact definition or limitation„ . upon it depends the
security of social order, the life and health of the citizen ...." Id. at 62.
" See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
"" See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
" 7 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (Court, found anti-noise statute
neither vague nor overbroad).
"" See infra note 91.
8" See, e.g.. Ellis v, O'Hara, 612 F. Supp, 379, 380-81 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (court found that
the statutory language "substantially equivalent" was void for vagueness); RoetnItild v. State,
251 Ga. 569, 571, 308 S.E.2d i54, 157 (1983) (court found Georgia statute was not sufficiently
definite in noting that a home school could nix constitute a private school); State v. Popanz,
112 Wis. '2d 166, 171-73, 332 N,W.2d 750, 753-54 (1983) (court held the term "private
school" used in the Wisconsin statute was unconstitutionally vague because it left the school
attendance officer to define the term).
"" See .supra note 89; see also infra note 92.
" 1 ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (1987) ("is provided an academic education comparable to
that offered by the public schools in the area"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1986) ("is
elsewhere receiving equivalent instruction in studies taught in the public schools"); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 31-401 (1982) ("instruction given ... is deemed equivalent by the Board of Education
to the instruction given in the public school"); IowA CODE § '299.1 (Stipp, 1987) ("may attend
upon equivalent instruction by a certified teacher elsewhere"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN, tit. 20-
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faced constitutional challenges on the basis that such language is
too vague or overbroad." The Supreme Court holds that a statute
is too vague if people of ordinary intelligence must guess at its
meaning and would differ as to its application."' Such statutes are
unconstitutional because they do not allow an individual to deter-
mine what is lawful and what is not." 4 A citizen thus will not have
fair warning and may unknowingly be trapped into breaking the
law. In addition, overbroad statutes and vague statutes will give too
much discretion to officials charged with enforcing the law."' Finally,
a vague or overbroad law may scare citizens and thereby inhibit or
chill their exercise of protected civil rights. 96 States are divided as
A, § 5001-A(3) (Supp. 1987) ("obtains equivalent instruction in a private school or in any
other manner arranged for by the school board and approved by the commissioner");
Mu. attic. CODE ANN. § 7-301 (Supp. 1987) ("is otherwise receiving regular, thorough
instruction during the school year in the studies usually taught in the public schools"); Mass.
GEN. L. ch. 76 § I (1982) ("or being otherwise instructed in a manner approved by the
superintendent or the school committee ... that the instruction in all studies ... equals in
thoroughness and efficiency, and in the progress made therein, ... that in the public
schools"); Mimi. Comp. LAws § 15.41561 (1987) ("state approved nonpublic school... teaches
subjects comparable to those taught in the public schools to children of corresponding age
and grade"); NEV. Riw. STAT. § 392.070 (1986) ("the child is receiving at home or in some
other school equivalent instruction of the kind and amount approved by the state board of
education,"); N.J. Rs:s'. STAT. § 18A:38.25 (1985) ("a ... school in which there is given
instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools"); N.C. GEN. STAT. 115C-378
(Supp. 1985) ("and such nonpublic: schools as have teachers and curricula that are approved
by the State Board of' Education ... and maintain such minimum standards as are
required of public schools"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16.19-2 (1981) ("the school committee shall
approve a private school or private instruction ... when ... the period of attendance ... is
substantially equal to that required by law in public schools;.... [subjects are] taught in the
English language substantially to the same extent as such subjects are required to be taught
in the public schools"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (1958 & Supp. 1987) ("is being furnished
with equivalent education"); Wis. STAT. § 118.15(4) (1973) ("approved by state superinten-
dent as substantially equivalent to instruction given to children of like ages in the public or
private schools").
"2 See, e.g., Ellis v. O'Hara, 612 F. Supp. 379, 380-81 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (court found that
the statutory langauge "substantially equivalent" was void for vagueness); Fellowship Baptist
Church v. Benton, 620 F. Stipp. 308, 318 (D, Iowa, 1985) (court held statutory language
"equivalent instruction" unconstitutionally vague); Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine, 549 F.
Stipp. 1208, 1226-27 (I). Me. 1982) (court held that statutory language "equivalent instruc-
tion" was not unconstitutionally vague, trusting the state authorities to construe the term
narrowly); State v. Labarge, 134 Vt. 276, 279-80. 357 A.2d 121, 124-25 (1976) (court held
statutory language of "equivalence" was riot unconstitutionally vague, trusting state officials
to interpret).
93 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
"4 Id.
95 Id. at 108-09, 114.
96 Id. at 109.
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to whether the language, "substantially equivalent" or "equivalent,"
is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.°
Although a statute may be constitutional on its face, it may be
applied in an unconstitutional fashion.98 Unconstitutional applica-
tions may occur because the statutes often leave room for local or
state authority to approve of alternative educational programs. 99
These authorities may create their own rules within statutory
boundaries.") Thus, state officials may interpret a lenient statute
so that it includes stringent requirements. For example, the Mas-
sachusetts statute gives much discretion to local school committees
and superintendents.m The State Board of Education sets the age
limits and days that students are required to be in school. 102 Local
school committees approve private schooling and home schooling.
The school committee will approve both types of schooling if it finds
that the education offered and actually learned is equivalent to that
in the public schools in the same town.'°' Thus, the statute permits
local school committees or superintendents to make many of the
important educational decisions and, therefore, is most likely to be
attacked on the basis of a particular school committee's interpreta-
97 See supra note 92. It is interesting to note that, although neither Maine nor Vermont
round the language "equivalent" to be unconstitutionally vague, each state has defined it
differently. Lines, supra note 1, at 21 I.
9" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). The Court noted that "[al regulation
neutral on its lace may, in its application, nonetheless ()fiend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id. at 220.
9' See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 298-8, 9 (1985) (specified age, amount of days of study);
INn. Com § 20-8.1-3-17 (Supp. 1987) (specified age, amount of days of study, and taught in
the English language); N.J. STA•. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (1968) (specified age, equivalent instruc-
tion).
"") See infra text accompanying notes 219-48. 1..ocal and state authorities are acting on
behalf of the state. Therefore, it is of little consequence to parents or courts, in determining
if rights have been infringed upon, whether, requirements were created by state statute or
these authorities.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 76, § 1 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
1 ' 2 Id. "Every child between the minimum and maximum ages established for school
attendance by the hoard or education" shall attend school. Id. Children shall attend "during
the number of clays required by the hoard of education in each school year." Id.
I"' Id. The statute provides that "the instruction in all the studies required by law equals
in thoroughness and efficiency, and in the progress made therein, that in the public schools
in the same town." Id. Specifications for private school approval are meant to include home
schooling as well, Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. '324, 331, 504 N.E.2d 592, 597
(1987). Massachusetts courts have held that the "equivalency" language is not unconstitu-
tionally vague. See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F.
Supp. 293, 310 (D. Mass. 1987); Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Pub. Schools, 616 F.
Supp. 81 (H. Mass. 1984).
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tion rather than on its face.'" Because statutes can be interpreted
in a variety of ways, a statute may be constitutional on its face, but
be applied in an unconstitutional fashion.'° 5
In sum, the Supreme Court has recognized a wide variety of
important state interests in education. In particular, the Court has
noted the value of preparing citizens to participate effectively in
society and inculcating obedience. The Court has also found that
states possess the general power to enforce compulsory education
laws that are confined within the state interest of providing a basic
education. The Court has applied a .balancing framework to the
decisions it has made in this area, and thus has not had the oppor-
tunity to decide if the state interest is compelling under a strict
scrutiny framework. The Court has, however, made it clear that the
state interest in education is crucial to maintaining our society and
that instituting this interest is perhaps the state's most important
function.
11. PARENT INTERESTS AND THE SUPREME COURT
Although the state interest in education is substantial, courts
have also recognized parents' interest in guiding the education of
their children as both important and rooted in legitimate constitu-
tional arguments. Courts have held this parental interest to be
primarily grounded in either the first or fourteenth amendments.
This section discusses why parents have been dissatisfied with the
education permitted under state statutes, upon what constitutional
bases a parent's right might rest, and which constitutional rationales
the Supreme Court has accepted and might accept.
Parents' dissatisfaction with how states have chosen to manifest
their recognized interest in education is evidenced by the increased
number of families choosing educational alternatives outside those
approved by state statute.'° 6 Those parents choosing unauthor-
ized,'°7 alternative types of schooling for their children tend to do
so for a myriad of reasons encompassing a full range of political
104
 Although litigants will tend to attack a statute both on its face and as applied, because
the courts have already determined the statute is constitutional, the focus of decisions has
been on its application. See, e.g., Charles, 399 Mass. at 324-33; New Life, 666 F. Supp. at 310.
jG5 See supra note 98; see also State v. Labarge, 134 Vt. 276, 279-81,357 A.2d 121, 124-
`25 (1976) (state board of education judged to have gone beyond statutory authority).
Lines, supra note I, at 191.
'" 7 Unauthorized alternatives are those school alternatives not approved by the state.
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and religious ideals and values,'" For example, the recent growth
in fundamentalist Christian organizations has been accompanied by
an increase in parents who are unhappy with the secular nature of
public schools and who have not found suitable private religious
schools. Other parents feel that their children can receive a better
education with less structure and more attention through home
schooling.'°9 Both liberal and conservative parents may object to
political and cultural values that they believe public or approved
private schools disseminate."° Consequently, conflict between par-
ents' interests in determining their children's education and the
state interest in ensuring adequate education has become inevitable
and is likely to continue.'"
Courts have held parents' interest in the upbringing of their
children to be rooted in the fourteenth and first amendments to
the Constitution."' Parents who rely primarily on the fourteenth
amendment may argue that their right to guide the education of
their children is implicit in the liberty protected in the due process
clause or is contained within the rubric of the right of privacy.'"
Parents whose schooling decision is primarily a religious choice may
rely on the protections of the first amendment free exercise clause
as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment." Pa-
rental claims under these amendments met with differing degrees
of success as courts analyzed the claims with different frame-
works."'
'°" Lines, supra note 1, at 190.
1 °9 1d.
IFS Lines, An Overview, supra note 70.
to id.
112 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972) (Court held that the parents'
right to guide and direct the education of their children was primarily grounded in the first
amendment free exercise clause); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (Court
held that the fourteenth amendment liberty protection encompassed the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control).
See infra notes 116-172.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (Court held that the first amend-
ment free exercise clause applied to state action through the fourteenth amendment).
115 New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (ll, Mass.
1987) (court applied strict scrutiny); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504
N.E,2d 29'2 (1987) (court primarily balanced the interest involved, holding that the state may
make reasonable regulations); Attorney General v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.E.2d 139
(1982) (court applied strict scrutiny); State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d
571 (1981) (court applied a balancing analysis, holding that reasonable government regula-
tions are permissible).
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A. Parents' Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The fourteenth amendment states that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.""" Parents have argued that raising and educating their chil-
dren as they determine falls within generally accepted notions of
liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment due process
clause."' The Supreme Court accepted this view of the fourteenth
amendment in the 1920s with a trilogy of cases dealing directly with
compulsory education." 8 At the time these cases arose, the Court
had been utilizing the notion of substantive due process, primarily
in regard to economic rights." 9 The Supreme Court protected the
economic rights of the schools in these cases, but extended the use
of due process to parents' right to guide the education of their
children. 12" The Court, faced with having to reconcile the state's
interest and parents' rights, chose to apply a balancing frame-
work.' 21
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that an Oregon
statute that compelled public school attendance and prohibited any
other form of education was unconstitutional.' 22 The state enforced
the statute against the Society of Sisters, a Catholic institution that
cared for and educated children, and Hill Military Academy, which
provided education and military training for children. The Court
recognized the interests of both the parents and the state in holding
" 6 U.S. Corisr. amend. XIV.
m See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
," Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' 19 Bitits.r & LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 210-15 (2d ed.
1985). The "Lochner" period was one in which the Court used the notion of substantive due
process primarily in the area of economics. Id. It was during this period that the Court
recognized parents' rights to guide the education of their children. Id. at 658-61. Although
the Court abandoned the economic due process analysis that marked the era, "it never
purported in abandon the substantive due process protection of noneconomic rights" such
as those noted in Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Id. at 660; see
also Hennessey, Explosion in Family Law Litigation, 14 FAM. L. Q. 187, 191-92 (1980) (noted
Court's repudiation of substantive due process to protect economic rights and continued
reaffirmance of substantive due process to protect family related rights); NOWAK, ROTUNDA,
& YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL Law 436-61 (2d ed. 1983) (text describes downfall of use of
substantive due process in economic areas and outlines its emergence in the right of privacy,
among other areas).
120 See infra text accompanying notes 122-139.
12 ' Id.
122 268 U.S. at 530-31. In Pierce the Court also addressed the property right of private
schools to remain in business under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Id.
Because substantive due process fell into disfavor, this issue will not be discussed. Id.
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that the statute went too far in impinging on the parents' fourteenth
amendment liberty right to guide the upbringing of their chil-
dren.'" The Court determined that the state had a legitimate in-
terest in and authority to reasonably regulate all schools. The Court
held that it is "reasonable" for the judiciary to allow a state to
"inspect, supervise and examine" schools, and also to allow a state
to require that all children at set age limits attend, that teachers be
moral and patriotic, and that studies advocate good citizenship and
do not conflict with public policy. 12,1
The Court, however, ruled that the legislation went too far in
interfering with the parents' fourteenth amendment liberty right to
guide their children's education.'" The Court:, in acknowledging
the rights of parents, noted that "the child is not the mere creature
of the State;" parents have the right and the duty to nurture and
direct their children's destiny.' 26 The Court went further in describ-
ing the importance of the parents' rights, noting that such rights
are fundamental to our system of government and common notions
of liberty. 127
Thus the Court in Pierce legitimized both the state's and par-
ents' interests, and grounded the parents' interest in the fourteenth
amendment.' 28 The Court resolved the conflict between interests
by holding that a state may regulate a child's schooling so long as
it does so in a reasonable fashion — that is, the enacted law must
bear a reasonable relation to the state's legitimate interest in edu-
cation. The Court balanced the two important interests involved in
order to find the "reasonable" middle ground.' 29
The other two cases resolved in the 1920s also recognized
parents' liberty right within the clue process clause, though they
dealt not with the prohibition of alternative schools, but with the
regulation of alternative schools and subject matter)" In Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court held "unreasonable" and thus unconstitutional
I" Id. at 531-33.
' 24 Id. at 534.
I " id. at 534-35.
12"Id. at 535.
'" Id. The Court stated that "Nile fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children." Id.
128 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
49 Id. at 534-35.
"" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of foreign
languages); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. '284, 298-99 (1927) (statute dictating strict
requirements for private schools).
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a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages
to any child who had not passed the eighth grade.'" The Court
again relied on the fourteenth amendment liberty clause to hold
that the statute violated the parents' right to choose appropriate
education for their children.'" The Court noted that the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
includes the right "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children."'" The state argued that it had an
interest in promoting good citizenship and imparting American
values through education.' 34 The Court did not deny that the state
had such an interest, and did not question "[t]he power of the State
to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable reg-
ulations for all schools."' 35 This state interest, the Court added,
includes prescribing a curriculum. The Court, however, ruled that
the statute unreasonably impinged on the basic right of parents to
determine the subjects taught at the school of their choosing, 138
In the third of the trilogy of cases, Farrington v. Tokushige, the
Court again applied a balancing process similar to that applied in
Meyer.'" In Farrington, the Court struck down a Hawaiian statute
which, in effect, dictated all the characteristics of the private schools.
The Court found that the statute would "probably destroy most, if
not all" of the affected schools.' 38 Again, the Court acknowledged
both interests, but held that the state had gone too far in impinging
on the parent's liberty right to control their children's education.' 39
Pierce, Meyer, and Farrington represent the Supreme Court's first
attempts to reconcile parents' rights to control their children's ed-
ucation and upbringing and the state's interest in compulsory ed-
ucation. In each case the Court recognized that parents' rights to
guide the education of their children are grounded in the liberty
" 1 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
132 Id. The Court also held that the right of foreign language teachers to have access to
gainful employment was protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id.; see also supra notes
119, 122.
'" Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
1 " Id. at 398.
"5 Id. at 402.
136 Id, at 402, 403.
"7 See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927).
138 Id. at 298-99.
59
 Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298-99. Because Hawaii was not a state, the Court applied the
due process clause of the fifth amendment to protect these important parental rights. Id. at
299. The due process of the fifth amendment affords the same protection as the due process
of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
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protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Court used a balanc-
ing framework, weighing the state infringements of parents' rights
in an attempt to define the "reasonableness" standard it established.
Under the reasonableness standard, the state's regulations concern-
ing education must be reasonably related to the state's educational
goals and must not unreasonably infringe parents' rights. Although
the Supreme Court was not specific, it made clear that some alter-
natives to public school are reasortable."° In addition, the Court
indicated a state may make reasonable regulations concerning the
curriculum and teacher qualifications in non-public schools, and
may inspect and examine such schools to make sure they comply. 141
Although the Court did not set forth an exact definition of "rea-
sonable," it held that the three statutes in question exceeded rea-
sonableness on their face." 2
The Court utilized the notion of substantive clue process at the
time these cases arose."3 In the years following these cases the use
of substantive clue process fell into general disfavor with the Court
until the doctrine's reemergence through the general right of pri-
vacy and other fundamental rights."'' Despite the trend away from
the use of substantive due process, the Court continued to hold that
parents' right to guide the education of their children is important
to the very fabric of our society.''''
Wisconsin v. Yoder marks the most significant and last attempt
the Supreme Court has made to reconcile the state and parental
interests in compulsory education."" The Court in Yoder exempted
Amish children from the state compulsory attendance law, applying
both the first and fourteenth amendments."' Amish parents ob-
jected to sending their children to school beyond the eighth grade,
arguing that their religious principles compelled them to keep their
children at home where they could teach them practical skills such
1411 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (Court allowed for schools
other than public school).
141 Meyer v. NebraSka, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (Court allowed the state to compel
attendance and "to make reasonable regulations"). See generally Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927) (Court allowed basic curriculum).
142 See SUPT(/ notes 122-139 and accompanying text. Today plaintiffs challenge statutes
on their face primarily with claims that the statutes are vague or overbroad. See, e.g., infra
text accompanying notes 222-31.
"3 See .supra note 119.
"4 Id.
15 Id.
'0 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
147 Id.
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as farming.'" The state law, however, required that each child stay
in school until the age of sixteen.' 49
The Court focused primarily on the first amendment. It distin-
guished between claims based solely on the fourteenth amendment
liberty clause and those based on religious beliefs, stating that a
claim based solely on personal preference or secular belief would
not demand the same weight as a claim based on religious beliefs.' 50
The Court noted that it was important that the claim being brought
was not the result of some recent or progressive method of chil-
drearing. 15 ' The Court argued that religious beliefs added much
weight to the parent's claim, a position which may have been held
over from the Court's reluctance to use substantive due process.' 52
The Court implied that a religious underpinning may be crucial to
parents' claims.'"
Despite deemphasizing the parents' fourteenth amendment
claims, the Court cited Pierce and Meyer to support its finding that
it is beyond debate and a firmly established tradition in this country
that parents are primarily responsible for the raising of their chil-
dren.'" Although such a statement would support a fourteenth
amendment view, the Court chose to interpret Pierce as a case that
stood "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious
upbringing of their children."'" This interpretation is particularly
troubling in that the Pierce opinion did not even mention the first
amendment.''"'
The Supreme Court has not had another chance to decide a
similar case since its decision in Yoder. Thus, the Court has not had
the opportunity to decide if the parental right to guide the educa-.
tion of one's children, as protected by the liberty of the due process
clause, is a fundamental right under the modern strict scrutiny
"8 1d, at 235-36.
14 " Id. at 207.
Id. at 216. The Court stated that lilt can not be overemphasized that we are not
dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently
discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern
life." Id.
15 ' Id. at 235.
152
 Id. at 216,235.
j53
'" Id. at 232.
1 " Id. at 233.
1 '6 See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. Although one of the two claimants did represent a religious
school, the Court never addressed the first amendment. Id.
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analysis. The language in the cases indicates that the Court consid-
ers the right important to the fabric of our society. Since Yoder, the
Court has reaffirmed the parental rights noted in Pierce and
Meyer.' 57 With the renaissance of substantive clue process through
fundamental rights, parents today are more likely to argue that
guiding the education of their children is a family decision protected
by the right of privacy.' 58 The Supreme Court has held that certain
rights may be characterized as general privacy rights and are pro-
tected by the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty."' 59 Because this general privacy right can be derived from the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, there may be
little difference in constitutional analysis between a parent's claim
utilizing the right of' privacy and a parent's claim utilizing the liberty
protected in the due process clause.' 00
As the Supreme Court has not been faced with a compulsory
education case since Yoder, it has also not had the opportunity to
extend the right of privacy to parents' right to guide the education
of their children. The rights that the Court holds are within the
rubric of "privacy" are fundamental, requiring strict scrutiny anal-
ysis.'"' Basic familial rights, similar to parents' right to guide the
1 • 7 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) (the Court analogized the
rights being adjudicated with "[d]ecisions concerning child rearing, which Yoder, Meyer, Pierce
and other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional protection"); Cleveland Rd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (the Court cited Pierce and Meyer in noting
that it "has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is one
of the liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Stanley
v, Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 651 (1972) (the Court noted that "[t]he rights to conceive and to
raise one's children have been deemed 'essential'"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482-83 (1965) (although the Court refused to delve into substantive due process thr economic
problems, the Court categorically stated, we affirm the principle of the Pierce and Meyer
cases").
15" BREST & LEVINSON, supra note - 119, at 657-63.
159 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (the Court mentioned the fourteenth amend-
ment, the first amendment, the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and the ninth amendment
as possible sources of the right of privacy, but the majority chose the fourteenth amendment).
1"" Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15 (1976) (the Court noted that "Mlle
Meyer-Pierce-Yoder parental right and the privacy right ... may be no more than verbal
variations of a single constitutional right"); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
Roe Court held that "the Court or individual justices have, indeed, found at least the roots
of that 'Iglu in the ... concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... rfiliese decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of 'ordered liberty,'" id. at 152, are included in this
general privacy right.
"" See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54 (the Court held that die right of privacy extended
to a mother's right to abort a fetus, and that the right was fundamental).
882	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol 30:861
education of their children, are often considered fundamental
rights. t'" For example, the Court has held fundamental rights to
exist in such areas as procreation, marriage, and living arrange-
ments. ' "3
To support the recognition of fundamental rights under the
right of privacy, the Court invariably relies on the holdings in Pierce
and Meyer to create the context in which a right may be defined as
fundamental.'" For example, in Rae v. Wade the Court recognized
a mother's right to abort a fetus as a fundamental right within the
right of privacy.' 65
 In reaching its decision, the Court stated that its
past decisions reflected similar protections for those personal rights
deeply rooted in our society, citing both Pierce and Meyer.'" Thus,
the Court noted in dicta that the right of privacy extends to other
rights such as "child rearing and education."'" 7
For a right to be fundamental it must be rooted in the traditions
of our society.' 68
 As noted above, the Court found parents' rights
to guide the education of their young to be "an enduring American
1" Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrruTioNat, LAW 985-87
(1978).
' 63
 See, e.g., supra notes 17, 161. The Supreme Court has held that the right to an
education is not fundamental, San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
The Rodriguez Court held that the tax system used to fund public schools in Texas did not
disadvantage a suspect class or interfere with a fundamental right. Id. The Court ruled that
there is no fundamental right to be educated by the state. Id. at 35-37. According to the
Court, the importance of the service of education does nut determine whether it is a fun-
damental right. Id. at 30. The Court affirmed this decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
223 (1982), where it held that withholding funds for the public education of children who
were not "legally admitted" into the country is constitutional. In Plyler, the Court held that
education is not a fundamental right so as to require the state to show it has a compelling
interest in not financing the public education of aliens. Id. at 216-24. These cases do not
touch on parents' right to guide the education of their children as discussed in this note.
The cases discussed in this note involve parents who are nut demanding public education,
but wish to take responsibility for educating children on their own.
161
 See, e.g., supra note 168.
165
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
i(6 Id. at 152-53.
167 Id.
' 68
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., joined by
Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring). These Justices recognized that the due process
clause protects those liberties that are rooted in the traditions and consciences of our people
and thus are to be considered fundamental. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Roe held
that "[d]ecisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
.'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' ... are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy." Id. The Court also made it clear that "the right has some extension to activities
relating to child rearing and education." Id.; see also Hennessey, supra note 119, at 191-
92 (noting that the Court looks to tradition in determining which rights are fundamental).
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tradition, at the very heart of the precepts of our country."" 1° As
discussed earlier, strict scrutiny analysis applies to fundamental
rights.'" Under such an analysis, a state may not impinge on such
a right unless the action it is taking is the least restrictive alternative
to achieving a compelling state interest."'
Thus, parents may argue that their long recognized right to
guide the rearing and education of their children is fundamental
under either a privacy or liberty' theory and that, therefore, courts
should subject any state infringements of this right to strict scrutiny
analysis. Such an analysis would limit, though not eliminate, the
state's ability to regulate schools.' 72 The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized parents' right to guide the education of their children
under the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause. Although such use of the due process clause fell into
disfavor, the due process clause has seen a renaissance in the guise
of the right of privacy.• Further, the Court has not waivered from
its earlier decisions recognizing this important parents' right. The
Court has recognized similar rights as fundamental under the right
of privacy. it has, in fact, extended that right to education in dicta.
Thus, in the Supreme Court's attempts to reconcile parents' rights
to educate their children with the state's interest in compulsory
education, the Court applied a balancing test that limited the state
to reasonable actions.
B. Parents' Rights Under the First Amendment
Parents who object to state approved schooling upon religious
grounds often seek the protection of the free exercise clause of the
first amendment of the Constitution.'" The first amendment reli-
1" Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
170 See supra note 13.
171 Id.
172 Id. Application of a strict scrutiny framework limits state action to the least restrictive
alternative needed to achieve the basic education of all children. Id. Parents' rights to choose
the type of education desired for their children does not extend to controlling public schools.
See generally supra note 163,
175 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1972) (parents of Amish children
required that children leave school at fourteen as part of their religious lifestyle). The
Supreme Court extended the prohibitions of the first amendment free exercise clause to
state and local governments by the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940); see also New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F.
Supp. 293, (D. Mass. 1987) (free exercise and establishment clauses); Care and Protection of
Charles, 399 Mass, 324, 504 N.F..2c1 592 (1987) (free exercise and establishment clauses);
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause).
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gious protections of the free exercise clause arise from the language,
"[c]ongress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion.'" Parents have claimed that state statutes, as enforced or
on their face, interfere with their right to exercise their religion
freely.' 75 The Supreme Court has defined "free exercise" as both
the freedom to hold religious beliefs and the freedom to act in
accord with those beliefs.' 7" Courts recognize the freedom to believe
as absolute; the freedom to act, however, is viewed as not "totally
free from legislative restrictions." 177 The individual must have a
"sincere belief" on which the state has placed a burden.' 78
The Supreme Court did not apply the first amendment to
compulsory education cases in its decisions in the 1920s. 179 The
Court's decision in Yoder, however, directly rested on the free ex-
ercise clause. 18" The Court in Yoder adopted the balancing frame-
work used in Pierce, Meyer, and Farrington, and applied it to the.first
amendment free exercise clause.' 8 ' The Court recognized the im-
portance of state and parent interests in its decision.' 82 The statute,
which compelled school attendance until a child became sixteen
years old, when applied to the Amish would require them to choose
between following their religion or breaking the law.'" The Court
ruled that•the statute placed a burden on a sincere religious belief,
the litmus test to determine a violation of the free exercise clause.' 84
Because the Court has held that such religious rights are not ab-
solute, the Court was forced to decide whether the state placed too
174 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Much case law has been required to define what amount or
type of conduct constitutes an infringement of this right. See infra notes 122-24 and accom-
panying text. Must of these cases do not deal with compulsory education, but help to define
what constitutes an impingement on this right. Id.
See New Life, 666 F. Supp. at 294-95; Charles, 399 Mass. at 325,504 N.E.2d at 594;
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-09.
176 Braunfeld v. Brown,  366 U.S. 599,607-09 (1961) (Court held that statute prohibiting
retail sale of' clothing and home furnishings on Sundays neither violated Jewish appellant's
right of free exercise of religion nor constituted a violation of the establishment clause).
'" Id. at 603.
'7H
	 v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,717-18 (Court held that the "state may justify
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling interest").
''" See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
1411 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,231-35 (1972).
1,1 ! Id.
' 82 Id. at 220-35.
187 Id. at 219-20.
144 Id. at 216-19.
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great a burden on the Amish's sincere religious belief's.'" The Court
noted that "cases such as this one call for delicate balancing of
important but conflicting interests."'"
The Yoder Court noted that neither the state's nor the parents'
interest was absolute.' 87 The Court acknowledged the weight of each
interest, commenting that the state interest in "providing public
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State."' 88 Al-
though the Court delineated the problem of balancing the interests
in the case before it, it did riot provide a roadmap for future courts
to follow, but merely noted a number of factors courts should
consider in resolving these conflicting interests. 189
Upon consideration of these factors, the Court held that the
goals of compulsory education would not be thwarted by allowing
the Amish children to leave school at fourteen years of age. Among
the factors the Court weighed was the length of time the Amish
have held their beliefs.'• The Court implied that it was impressed
with the long history of the Amish.' 9 ' In addition, the Court focused
on the Amish reputation for lawfulness and aggrandized the farm-
ing lifestyle that the Amish lead.' 92 The Court reasoned that ensur-
ing that citizens become independent and successful in society is
one of the most basic rationales behind the state interest in educa-
tion.'" After considering these factors, the Court was satisfied that
the Amish children would be able to function successfully in society
even if they later chose to leave the order. 194 The Yoder Court was
thus convinced that the Amish ,children satisfied the essence of the
state interest in education, and was not convinced that the two years
of schooling that the Amish children would miss would be crucial
to their Future successful participation in society.' 98 Thus, the Court
balanced the state's interest in education with the Amish parent's
first amendment rights. 190
," Id. at 259.
I " Id. at 237 (White, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J., & Stewart, j.).
I" Id, at 234-35.
188 Id. at 213.
189 See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
"Id. at 219.
191 Id,
," Id. at 213, 222.
19" M. at 221.
194 Id . at 222-26.
'"s Id. at '222.
06 Id.
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Although the Supreme Court has not decided other compul-
sory educational cases since Yoder, subsequent Court decisions have
dealt with cases based on similar first amendment free exercise
claims.' 97 In these cases the Court adopted a strict scrutiny frame-
work in dealing with the free exercise clause.' 95 Under strict scru-
tiny, the Court dispensed with balancing interests and, therefore,
no longer differentiated between the weight given various consti-
tutional claims either individually or collectively.' 99 Under this new
framework, when a state infringes upon a right protected by the
free exercise clause of the first amendment, strict scrutiny neces-
sarily applies. 20°
The Supreme Court set out this new framework in a series of
cases that did not concern education. 2°' For example, the Supreme
Court in its decision in Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment
Security Divisionm struck down state laws that placed a burden on
an individual's sincere religious beliefs. 203 The Court spoke not of
balancing, but of least restrictive alternatives. 204 In Thomas, the
Court noted that once a state law or its enforcement has violated
the free exercise rights of the claimant, "the state may justify an
inroad of religious liberty by showing that the law in question is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state inter-
est."205 The Court in Thomas held that the state law denying un-
employment benefits to people who voluntarily left their job was
unconstitutionally applied to someone who felt compelled to quit
because of religious reasons. 20" The Court noted that Thomas re-
" 7 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,261 (1981) (Court held that the imposition
of social security taxes was not unconstitutional in light of first amendment free exercise
claims presented); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Court held state's denial of
unemployment compensation to Jehovah's Witness violated his first amendment rights); see
also infra note 212.
3 " Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 (Court noted that the state may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest);
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-19 (Court noted that only if the state utilized the least restrictive
means to achieve a compelling state interest could the state justify an inroad on religious
liberties).
119 See generally supra notes 1198,13.
210 See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 119, at 1060-61.
201 See infra notes 202-16 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 197-200 and
accompanying text.
202 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment compensation to Jehovah's
Witness violated his first amendment rights).
511 ' Id. at 718-20.
a" Id. at 718.
2°5 Id.
216 Id. at 718-20.
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fused to help produce weapons and asked to be laid off; when the
company refused, he was forced to quit."' The Court found that
the state law, as applied to Thomas, forced him to choose between
violating state law or violating his religion. 208 The Court ruled that
the state interest in denying unemployment benefits to Thomas was
not compelling. 209 The test used in Thomas is clearly different from
the direct balancing inherent in the reasonable standard employed
in Yoder. 21 ° Thus, the Court has held that if the state action burdens
a claimant's religious beliefs, the state may continue its actions only
if the state has a compelling interest, and if the action taken is
essential to carry out the state interest or is the least restrictive
alternative. 2 "
The movement to refine the analytical process continued in
Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Council of Florida. 212 In Hobble, the
Court was again faced with an individual who refused to work on
his or her sabbath and was denied unemployment benefits. 2 " In
holding that the statute violated the free exercise clause of the first
amendment, the Court stated that strict scrutiny should apply when-
ever a first amendment right is at stake. 214 Strict scrutiny places the
burden on the state to show that its interest is compelling, that its
interest would be substantially harmed if the actions it sought to
undertake were disallowed, and that its actions are essential or the
least restrictive alternative. 213
Thus, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny in cases
where the free exercise clause is infringed upon. The Court has
not, however, had the opportunity to apply strict scrutiny to a
compulsory education conflict in which the free exercise clause is
involved. 216 It therefore remains an open question whether the
Court would analogously apply strict scrutiny to compulsory edu-
cation cases.
The Court has not had the opportunity to apply strict scrutiny
analysis in compulsory education cases involving either or both the
2°' Thomas v. Review 13d.,.450 U.S, 707, 713 (1981).
4118 Id. at 717-18.
209 1d. at 719.
210 See supra notes 179a-195 and accompanying text to compare to the test applied in
Thomas with the "reasonableness" test.
2" Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
212 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
2 " Id. at 1047-48,
214
	 at 1049.
sis Id. at 1049-50.
516 See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text. See also supra note 13.
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fourteenth amendment and the first amendment. Some lower
courts have, however, assumed such an analysis must logically be
applicable in either case. 217 The absence of a ruling by the Supreme
Court has left courts without guidance. What framework should be
applied, and within that framework, what are the boundary lines
of state and parent interests? Two recent Massachusetts cases de-
cided within months of one another in 1987 illustrate the differing
ways in which courts now analyze and decide this controversy.
111. CURRENT MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS: AN EXAMPLE OF STATES'
CONFUSION
The absence of a recent Supreme Court ruling, coupled with
broadly written state statutes, has forced each state court to adopt
its own framework . and boundary lines when confronted with the
compulsory educational issue. In Care and Protection of Charles, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Massachu-
setts compulsory education statute was constitutional both on its
face and in its application by the school committee of the Canton
school system.218 The court primarily balanced the parent's claims
with the state interest, deciding that the state had properly forbid-
den the parents to teach their children at home because the parents
had not fully complied with the school committee's regulations.2 ' 9
In Charles, a couple wished to educate their three children at
home because of religious convictions. The parents argued that, as
Christian parents, they were committed to teaching and raising their
children in the truths of the Bible. 22" Although the parents were
willing to provide a table of contents of their proposed curriculum,
they did not agree to school committee requirements that they allow
school visits for observation, document their educational back-
grounds, permit standardized testing, or state the number of hours
and clays that would be devoted to their children's instruction. 22 '
217 See, e.g., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293
(D. Mass. 1987) (court applied strict scrutiny in analyzing first amendment free exercise and
establishment clauses); State v. Whistler, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) (court
held that state standards relating to operation of schools was not the least restrictive alter-
native and thus was unconstitutional in light of parents' fourteenth and first amendment
rights).
2 " Charles, 399 Mass. at 340, 504 N.E.2d at 602.
219 Id. at 336-40, 509 N.E.2d at 599-602.
22" Id. at '325, 326, 504 N.E.2d at 594.
221 Id. at 327—'18, 509 N,E.2d at 594-95.
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The parents argued that the statute was too vague in calling for
"equivalency" and violated their first and fourteenth amendment
rights. 222
The court rejected the parent's first argument that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague.223 The court held that the statute met
the standard that a "detailed specification of standards is not re-
quired" in order that a statute withstand scrutiny. Further, the court
noted that the legislature intended that the approval process set out
for private schools he analogous to that for home schools. 224 Thus
the school committee was bound to follow the process as set out in
the statute. 225
The parents also claimed that the statute as applied interfered
with their constitutionally protected first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights. 226 The court did not discuss the first amendment rights
because it held that the rights protected by the free exercise clause
would afford the parents no greater protection than the right to
direct the education of one's children found in the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. 227 The court made no explanation
for this distinction. 228
After noting the importance of both the state's and the parents'
interests, the court stated that the school committee can and should
enforce "reasonable educational requirements." 229 The court also
stated that requirements for approval of a home school must be
essential to the state interest in ensuring that "all the children are
educated."'" Thus the court at the same time asked that the state
222 Id
. at 330, 504 N.E.2d at 596-97.
'2 ' Id. at 330-33, 504 N.E.2d at 596-98.
221 Id. at 330, 331, 504 N.E.2d at 97.
228 Id. at 333, 504 N.E.2d at 598.
Sal hi,
227 Id. at 333 n.8, 504 N.E.2d at 598 n.8. The court stated that "a basic right under the
Fourteenth Amendment is directing the educational upbringing of their children subject to
reasonable government regulation.... The free exercise of religion claims under neither
the United States nor the Massachusetts Constitution would entitle the parents to any greater
protection than we grant them in this opinion." Id. Note that the court states the fourteenth
amendment entitles the claimant to rights subject to "reasonable" regulation. Id.
228 Perhaps the court intended to apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Under such analysis, it
would not matter which fundamental rights were impinged upon, so long as one such right
was violated, in order to trip strict scrutiny. See .supra note 13. See also supra notes 179-95,
197-215. The court, however, did not apply strict scrutiny and it would be unusual for a
court not to discuss such important fourteenth amendment claims.
22 q Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 336, 504 N.E.2d 592, 599-600 (1987).
288 Id. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 600.
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enforce reasonable requirements, and only those that are essen-
tia1. 2" The court, therefore, seemed to oscillate between a Yoder-
like balancing test and the modern strict scrutiny analysis.
As in Yoder, the Supreme Judicial Court provided guidelines as
to how far the state may permissibly go in regulating alternative
education. The court in Charles held that parents must obtain ap-
proval, and obtain it prior to the children's leaving school. The
court stated that the parents must be given a chance to explain their
program, and, if turned down, a chance to appea1. 232 Furthermore,
the court held that if the parents begin teaching without approval,
the burden of proof is placed on the school committee to show that
the instruction will not equal "in thoroughness and efficiency, and
in progress made therein that in the public schools in the same
town .. . "233
The court set out standards which the school committee or
state may use as a guide to school acceptance. 234 Under those stan-
dards, a school committee may require certain basic subjects be
taught, and may properly consider the length of the proposed
school year and the hours of instruction in each subject. The com-
mittee may examine the competency of the parents or proposed
teachers, but may not require that parents be certified or have a
college or advanced academic degree. The committee must have
access to all instructional aids children will use, including lesson
plans and teaching manuals to be used by the parent or teacher. 2"
The court stated that the school committee may not use these man-
uals to dictate the manner in which subjects will be taught, but may
examine them only to ensure that the state interest is satisfied by
determining the type of subjects and the grade level of instruc-
tion. 23" Finally, the committee may require periodic standardized
testing to ensure educational progress and the attainment of mini-
mum standards. 237 Thus, the court permitted the school committee
considerable leeway in determining reasonable requirements for
home school approval. 238
831
	 at 336-37, 504 N.E.2d at 599-600.
252 Id. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 600.
235 Id. at 338, 504 N.E.2d at 601, see also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 76, 1 (1986).
2" Id. at 338, 504 N.E.2d at 601. The school committee acts on behalf of the state;
therefore, this note will use the two terms interchangeably.
23 .5 Id. at 338-39, 504 N.E.2d at 601-02.
2,6 1d. at 339, 504 N.E.2d at 601-02.
237 Id. at 339-40, 504 N.E.2d at 601-02.
23' Charles. 399 Mass. at 324, 504 N.E.2d at 592.
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The "reasonableness" framework the Supreme Judicial Court
applied in Charles contrasts with the framework that the United
States District Court for the district of Massachusetts used in New
Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow. 239 The court
in New Life, decided four and one-half months after Charles, applied
a strict scrutiny analysis and enjoined a school committee from
applying its particular approval process to an unapproved private
school and to the parents of "truants." 290 The court held that a strict
scrutiny framework was best suited to analyze the first amendment
claims that the plaintiffs raised."'
The plaintiffs in New Life, New Life Baptist Church Academy
and the parents of children who attended the school, argued that
the approval process for private schools 242 required by the East
Longmeadow school committee interfered with their constitutional
rights under the first amendment free exercise clause. 243 The plain-
tiffs did not object to most of the school committee's requirements,
agreeing to provide a copy of the curriculum, to teach the required
subjects for the required hours, to disclose identities of students
and the qualifications of their teachers, and to permit standardized
testing,244 The plaintiffs did, however, object to the requirement
that they ask for approval; the plaintiffs claimed that the approval
requirement interfered with their religious beliefs. 245 To seek ac-
creditation from the state, according to the plaintiffs, was a sin
because it placed the authority of the state above the authority of
God. They further argued that the requirement of on-site inspec-
tions and college degrees for teachers constituted an entanglement
between church and state. 246
The court in New Life applied strict scrutiny analysis, noting
that, although the Supreme Court had not applied such analysis to
compulsory education cases, the Court recently had applied strict
939 666 F. Stipp. 293 (court applied strict scrutiny); ef. Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d
592 (1987) (court primarily applied a reasonableness or balancing test).
21" New Life, 606 F.Supp. al 327-28.
241 Id. at 312-13.
242 The approval process as detailed in MASS. GEN. L. ch. 76, § 1, was interpreted to
apply to both private schools and home schools in the same fashion. Charles, 399 Mass. at
331, 504 N,E.2d ai 597. Thus, the basis for the approval process in New Life for a private
school is synonymous with that in Charles fOr a home school.
2' 3 New Life, 606 F. Stipp. at 325-28. The plaintiffs also raised claims under the estab-
lishment clause. Id. This note will not discuss claims under the establishment clause,
24qd. at 294-95, 298.
!J45
949 Id. at 294, 295.
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scrutiny to other first amendment claims. 247 The court in New Life
held that the approval process adopted by the school committee
infringed on the plaintiff's free exercise of religion. 248 The court
also recognized -that the state had a compelling interest in compul-
sory education. 24° The court concluded that the critical question was
whether East Longmeadow proved that its approval process was the
least restrictive means of assuring that the children who attend New
Life Academy were adequately educated. 25°
The court rejected the school committee's plea that the state
interest should be defined more broacIly. 25 ' The committee argued
that "an essential purpose of education is to instill in children a
`thirst for knowledge' and the reasoning skills to satisfy that
thirst." 252 The court found that this argument included the notion
that students need the capacity to question the religious faith they
share with their parents. 2" The court held that attempting to equip
children with the tools to question their own religious faith was not
a proper state goal and exceeded the state's legitimate interest in
basic education. 254
After refusing to expand the state's interest, the court in New
Life held that the approval process set out by the school committee
was not the least restrictive alternative of meeting this interest. 255
The court ruled that there were alternative ways of ensuring the
state statutory interest in education. 25" Although it did not set out
specific criteria, the court suggested that the following criteria might
suffice. First, the school must provide basic information to the
school committee regarding the students and the curriculum. Sec-
247 /d. at 313 & n.13. The court noted that, although Yoder suggested "a balancing
approach may be applicable to First Amendment claims, ... Nile evolution of the law since
Yoder . . . persuades this court that a balancing of competing interests is not now permitted
in deciding free exercise issues such as decided in this case." Id.
248 Id. at 319-20.
2 ' 9 M. at 307,317-19 & n.15.
250 /d. at 313.
251
 Id. at 317,318.
2" Id. at 305-18.
2" Id. at 307.
21" Id. at 318-19.
2' 5 Id. at 319-20.
25'3
	 at 320. The court suggested that the least restrictive alternative might entail,
"1. Basic information on students, school and curriculum and
2. Standardized testing combined with individual follow-up when indicated or
3. The requirements in #2 combined with a requirement that each teacher have appro-
priate academic credentials."
Id.
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and, the children ought to be given standardized tests with appro-
priate follow-up at the end of each school year. 2" The court left
open the possibility that some type of official teacher certification
might be required. 258 Thus the court held the East Longmeadow
school committee's approval process unconstitutional as alternatives
existed that would be less restrictive and nonetheless satisfy the state
interest in ensuring the basic education of all children. 259
In summary, the courts in these two cases applied different
frameworks of analysis to basically similar facts. The Massachusetts
statutory requirements are identical for home or private schools.
The school committees had promulgated similar regulations, re-
quiring a request for approval, standardized testing, the teaching
of certain core courses, and basic information about curriculum,
students, and teachers. The parents in both cases contended that
the regulations 'violated their first amendment rights, though the
parents in Charles also raised fourteenth amendment issues. In
Charles the court chose to ignore the first amendment claims and
focus solely on the parents' fourteenth amendment rights to guide
the education of their children. The court in Charles ruled that the
claimant would receive the same protection under the fourteenth
or first amendment. The court in Charles applied a balancing test
whereas the court in New Life applied strict scrutiny. Thus, the
courts applied completely different frameworks of analysis to sim-
ilar facts. The absence of a current Supreme Court case helps create
this situation in which it is unclear how courts should analyze com-
pulsory education claims.
IV. ANALYSIS
Courts ought to apply strict scrutiny to compulsory education
claims under either the first or the fourteenth amendment. Apply-
ing strict scrutiny will properly protect parents' rights by allowing
state action which infringes upon those rights only if such action is
circumscribed to what is essentially needed to fulfill a state's interest
in education. Further, the application of strict scrutiny may yield
more consistent results.
257 Id,
2" Id. at 321. The court noted that "it is not necessary or appropriate for this court to
decide now whether requiring certain academic credentials ... is a component of the least
restrictive means for the state to assure that. New Life students are adequately educated." Id.
259 Id, at 325-28.
894	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:861
The two cases above highlight both the use of conflicting frame-
works and the problems that ensue from the use of these different
frameworks. The court in Charles primarily applied the balancing
process outlined by the Supreme Court in Yoder while paying lip
service to the "least restrictive" language of the strict scrutiny doc-
trine. 26° The Charles court enforced reasonable educational require-
ments while stating that enforcement should be limited to require-
ments that are essential to fulfilling the state interest. 2" These views
are necessarily contradictory. A reasonableness test requires the
application of a balancing framework — the court ensuring that
state regulations are reasonably related to legitimate state goals and
that the regulations do not unreasonably infringe upon parent
rights.262 A strict scrutiny analysis, however, is implicated automat-
ically upon the infringement of a fundamental right; a court thus
requires that the state action be essential for the achievement of the
state interest. 263 Thus the Charles court failed to clearly apply a strict
scrutiny analysis where the infringement of the parents' fundamen-
tal rights entailed such scrutiny. The Charles court seemed to con-
ceptually confuse the two distinct frameworks of analyses.
In contrast to Charles, the court in New Life clearly applied strict
scrutiny. 264 The court made clear that it "is not called upon to
balance its perception of the weight of the burden on an individual's
religious belief against its assessment of the importance of the com-
peting state interest." 265 The court found the claimant's beliefs sin-
cere and held that the state's regulations infringed upon those
beliefs. 266 Thus, because the state's regulations infringed upon the
plaintiff's free exercise of religion, the court applied strict scrutiny
analysis and held that the regulations were unconstitutional. 267
The facts in these cases were not so significantly different as to
warrant the application of different frameworks. Both cases in-
volved the same statutory authority and similar school committee
regulations. 268 In both cases the claimants relied on the first amend-
26 ) See Charles, 399 Mass. at 336, 504 N.E.2d. at 599-600 (the court did not mention
fundamental rights in its analysis).
261 Id.
262 See supra notes 140-42.
26' See supra notes 143-45,171, 215 and accompanying text.
264 New Life, 666 F. Supp. 293, 219-20.
765 ld. at 313.
"6 Id. at 325-28.
"7 Id.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 224, 221 Sr 245.
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meat, though in Charles the claimant also relied on the fourteenth.'•
The only significant difference between these cases was that the
claimants in New Life agreed to follow most of the committee's
regulations, whereas the claimants in Charles did not. 27° Such a
difference might warrant a court making different conclusions
within one framework, but does not warrant applying completely
different frameworks altogether.
The application of different frameworks may necessarily pro-
duce different results. The balancing test utilized in the early Su-
preme Court cases and in Charles asks only that the state action be
reasonable. 27 ' Strict scrutiny, by contrast, requires that the state
action be the least restrictive alternative to achieve a compelling
state interest. 272 Assuming that the state interest in basic education
is compelling, the two tests may arrive at different results. 273 For
example, the requirements set out by the school committee in New
Life may well have been reasonable, although judged not the least
restrictive aiternative. 274 To be the least restrictive alternative, an
action must be more than reasonable; there must not be an alter-
native to that action that is feasible for the state to enforce. 275 Strict
scrutiny analysis therefore places greater limits upon the state's
power to promulgate educational regulations than a "reasonable-
ness" analysis. Thus, the courts in Charles and New Life employed
different frameworks, frameworks that necessarily may render di-
vergent holdings. 276 The facts in these cases were similar enough
269 See supra notes 226, 241 and accompanying text.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 221, 245.
271 See supra note 227, and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
2  The Supreme Court has not determined that the state interest is compelling, but
considering the value the Court has placed in this interest, it is likely that the interest is a
compelling one. See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, at 402 (1923). Further, the
Court would be likely to find the interest compelling because, without a compelling interest.,
the state would have no ability to regulate the parents' fundamental right within a strict
scrutiny framework. See supra note 13.
2" New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293, 295-98
(D. Mass. 1987).
275 See supra note 13.
276 In both cases parents contended that the local school board's regulations went too far
in violating their first amendment rights, though the parents in Charles also raised fourteenth
amendment issues. See supra notes 226-27, 247-50 and accompanying text. The Massachu-
setts statutory requirements are the same for home or private school education. See sutra
note 224 and accompanying text. Both school committees required similar regulations, calling
for standardized tests, the presentation of basic information, teaching certain core courses,
and some official observation. See supra notes 221, 245. Thus, the fact the parents in Charles
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that courts, utilizing the same framework, should reach the same
result in each case.
Courts ought to analyze any compulsory education case in
which there are claims based on the first amendment free exercise
clause with a strict scrutiny framework. Since the Supreme Court's
decision in Yoder, in which it analyzed first amendment concerns
within a balancing framework, the Court has held that an infringe-
ment of the free exercise clause triggers strict scrutiny analysis. 277
If a state statute places a burden on parents' sincere religious beliefs
concerning the education of their children, the court should follow
Supreme Court precedents and apply strict scrutiny.
Thus, the New Life court correctly applied strict scrutiny when
it determined that the school committee's regulations were burden-
ing the parent's religious befiefs. 278 The Charles court chose not to
discuss the first amendment claims raised by the claimant, holding
that such claims would not entitle the claimant to any more protec-
tion than the claimant was entitled to under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 27° The Charles court did not, however, apply strict scrutiny to
the general fourteenth amendment claims. 280 This suggests that the
court assumed either that first amendment claims do not require a
strict scrutiny analysis or that the particular regulations in question
did not amount to a state infringement on the parents' sincere
beliefs. 28 ' The court is clearly wrong if it asserts the former, and is
within its discretion if it asserts the latter. 282 In either case, the court
in Charles never made clear its reasoning in what was certainly a
questionable decision. In sum, if parents make a first amendment
claim and a court determines that the state burdened the parents'
sincere religious beliefs, the court must apply strict scrutiny. 288
Courts ought also to analyze all compulsory education claims
brought under either the right of privacy or the liberty component
objected to most of these requirements whereas the parents in New Life did not is not
something basic to analysis, but rather something fact specific. Id. This type of factual
distinction does not warrant the application of different frameworks of analysis.
2" See supra notes 177-216 and accompanying text.
278
	 Life, 666 F.Supp. 293, 312-13, 325-28.
"9 Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 333-34 n.8, 504 N.E.2d 592, 598 n.8
(1987).
28° Charles, 399 Mass. at 331, 340, 504 N.E.2d at 597, 602.
28i The court would not apply strict scrutiny in either Charles or New Life. See supra note
13 for a discussion of strict scrutiny.
282 This note is thus asserting only that strict scrutiny ought to apply to first amendment
claims and does not purport to argue that the court would have abused its discretion in
ruling that the state action was insufficient to cause a burden on the plaintiffs.
283 See supra notes 13, 197-216 and accompanying text.
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of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment with a
framework of strict scrutiny. Although the Supreme Court has not
had the opportunity to hold that parents' right to guide the edu-
cation of their children is fundamental, the Court has held that
similar familial rights are fundamental, and require strict scrutiny
analysis. 284 Before the advent of strict scrutiny, the Court held that
such parental rights were the cornerstone of our society, at the very
heart of our nationY85 The only exception to the force with which
the Supreme Court held this view, was the unexplained denigration
of the fourteenth amendment in Yoder. 286 Even in Yoder, however,
the Court noted that the general right of parents in guiding the
upbringing of their children was beyond debate. 287 The Yoder view
of the fourteenth amendment is best explained as a throwback to
the Court's dislike of substantive due process. 288
The Supreme Court's attitude about substantive due process
changed as the doctrine reemerged in the years after Yoder. 289 With
the onset of' strict scrutiny analysis, the Court has continually reaf-
firmed and analogized to the holdings of Pierce and Meyer in rec-
ognizing other familial rights. 2" If the Court found parents' right
to guide the education of their children fundamental, it would apply
the strict scrutiny framework upon determining that the state had
infringed upon this right. 2"'
In sum, courts should utilize the strict. scrutiny framework
whether claims are brought under the first or fourteenth amend-
ment in compulsory education cases. Courts ought to adopt strict
scrutiny so that litigants may be assured of consistency as to how
their claims will be viewed. More importantly, however, strict scru-
tiny ensures that the parents' interest in guiding the education of
their children, which is a right basic to our notions of' freedom, is
well protected. Although a state's interest may be compelling, a state
should not be able to impinge on important parental rights without
overcoming the burden of proving that its actions are the least
restrictive means towards its ends.
2" See supra notes 161 and 17,
2" See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Farrington v. Toktisllige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of' Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923),
Ybder, 406 U.S. at 206.
28 / Id, at 232.
"" See supra note 119.
Id.
290 See supra note 157.
2" See supra note 13.
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Although applying this framework of analysis will aid courts in
reconciling the interests involved, it will not solve the problem of
determining where to set the boundaries of the state interest. Un-
fortunately, creating a clear line between parents' rights and the
state interest, although perhaps aided by applying a consistent
framework, remains a difficult task. The Supreme Court itself has
noted that it is ill-prepared to delve into the particulars of educa-
tional practices."' The Charles court agreed with the Supreme
Court, quoting from Yoder, that "courts are not school boards or
legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of
discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory education." 298
In both Charles and New Life, the courts left to the litigants and the
lower courts the task of deciding what regulations were essential or
required.294 If courts consistently were to apply a strict scrutiny
framework, they would still have to decide which state actions were
essential to achieving the states' interest in basic education.
Despite recognizing their limitations, courts have been willing
to offer some guidance as to where these boundaries might lie. 295
Thus, although the courts have applied different frameworks, they
have generally agreed that certain requirements are essential to
achieve the goal of basic education. 298 For example, courts agree
that a state has the right to obtain information from alternative
schools regarding students and curriculum. 297 This information is
needed so that the school district will know where the children are
and what subjects the school will teach. Courts have allowed states
to require that schools teach certain core subjects and that children
spend a specified amount of time in instruction. 298 Thus, the state
interest in basic education can encompass a range of courses, usually
292 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
293 Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 337, 504 N.E.2d 592, 600 (1987).
294 New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass.
1987); Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 292.
295 Charles, 399 Mass. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 600.
296 Because some of these requirements come from courts applying strict scrutiny, and
some come from courts that did not, this list is not determinative or absolute. It is, however,
a good indication of what a court might consider are essential means of achieving the state
interest.
297 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); New Life Baptist Church Academy
v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1987); Care and Protection of Charles, 399
Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987).
Y" See, e,g,, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293
(D. Mass. 1987); Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass. 324, 504 N.E.2d 592 (1987); see
also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 71, §§ 1-3 (1982).
May 1989]	 COMPULSORY EDUCATION	 899
including national and state history, reading, writing, and arith-
metic. 2g9 To ensure that the children receive an adequate amount
of instruction, regulations prescribe the hours per day, days per
year, and even hours per subject."° To further ensure that children
are being provided the basic education, courts may require some
form of standardized testing."' By taking such tests, the state can
compare a student's progress with other students within the state. 302
Teacher certification and other issues, however, remain unde-
cided. 303 The Supreme Court has noted that courts are ill equipped
to delineate what exact programs or learning tools are essential to
fulfilling the states' interest in education." These decisions are
complex because they involve different theories of education as well
as the need to allow alternative schools flexibility. 305
A further complicating factor in attempting to reconcile these
interests is the question of whether the state interest should permit
broader state involvement in alternative schooling. In both New Life
and Yoder, the state argued that to achieve its recognized interest of
preparing children to be economically independent and to learn
the skills and values necessary to perpetuate our democracy, chil-
dren need more than the basics. 306 Massachusetts also argued that
the state interest ought to include ensuring that children become
independent thinkers so that they can make intelligent choices re-
garding religion."' Courts have not and should not accept such
arguments.
"9 See, e.g., Charles, 399 Mass. at 338-39, 504 N.E.2d at 601 (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch.
71, §§ 1-3 (1982)); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 m14.
500 Charles, 399 Mass. at 338-39, 504 N.E.2d at 601.
" I See, e.g., New Life, 666 F. Supp. at 303-06, 321 (contains a broad discussion of
standardized testing arid its reliability).
"Id.
"3 See id. at 321-22, 324 (discussion of teacher certification).
364 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. The Court recognized the ''obvious fact that courts are not
school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete
aspects of a State's program of compulsory education." Id.
" State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 206-123, 51 N.E.2d 750, 765-68 (1976)
(requirements that prescribed 415this of school day found not to be least restrictive alterna-
tive).
96 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (state desired to ensure that children were able to make
"intelligent" decision regarding whether or not they would wish to remain in the community);
New Life, 666 F. Supp. at 318 & n:15 (state desired to ensure that children would be able to
engage in "independent thinking"). The state also noted that Massachusetts, clue to its
constitution and high-tech economy, had a special interest in ensuring children received more
than a basic education. New Life, 666 F. Supp. at 318 & n.15. See supra note 26 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of state interest.
"7 See supra note 306.
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First, courts have correctly made it clear that the state may not
attempt to subjugate parents' right to raise their children in their
religious faith."' It is not a proper interest of the state to attempt
to help children question their religious beliefs. Such an interest is
obviously at odds with the constitutional protection of free exercise
of religion.
Second, it would seem improper for a state to broaden its
interest to more than a basic education when it is clear that, at
present time, many children are not even receiving these basics. 3°9
Before a state ought to consider requiring more than a basic edu-
cation, it must ensure that all children are receiving a basic educa-
tion. Many people with high school diplomas are functionally illit-
erate, although ironically, by completing high school, they have
attended school longer than is required by most compulsory edu-
cation laws."'" Studies have indicated that schooling and literacy do
not necessarily correlate.'" Thus, although children are attending
school, many are not learning even a basic education: 312 In light of
the current state of our schools, it seems improper for a state to
argue that the court should recognize its interest as in more than
basic education. Before a state ought to require private and home
schools to do more, it must ensure that children are learning the
basics.
In addition, although society has grown more complex, a child
who is proficient in the basics, as defined by Jefferson, may indeed
find him or herself in the minority of American students in the
market place."" Employers have found that many employees pos-
sess basic skill deficiencies in areas such as writing, reasoning, and
3°' See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; New Life, 666 F.Supp. at 318.
" D. HARMON, ILLITERACY: A NATIONAL DILEMMA 29 (1987). The number of illiterate
adults in America is a hard figure to pin down; low figures estimate that seventeen to twenty
one million Americans are illiterate, whereas the high figures estimate seventy two million.
Id. One indication of the poor education that high school students are offered can he
discovered by looking at community college entrants. Id. Researcher John Roliech found
that such students are "lacking in the basic skills: the most offered courses in American
community colleges are remedial reading, remedial writing, and remedial arithmetic." Id. at
41. Many scholars have found the condition of the school systems in America to have
deteriorated; as Barzun stated, "The once proud and efficient public school system of the
United States ... has turned into a wasteland where vice shares the time with ignorance and
idleness." j, BARZUN, TEACHER IN AMERICA (1945).
201 D. HARMON, supra note 309, at 41.
3" Id. at '31.
312 See generally 1). HARMON, supra note 288; BAILEY & FUSHEIM, LITERACY FOR LIFE: THE
DEMAND FOR READING AND WHITING (1983).
3" See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
May 1989]	 COMPULSORY EDUCATION	 901
speaking.' Thus, far from being unable to compete in the market
place, a student well versed in the basics may be the exception.
Finally, the purpose of the state interest of ensuring that citizens
have assimilated American values may be achieved through a basic
education, whereas attempting to ensure that children are econom-
ically independent is not easily solved even if a basic education were
being offered."`'
V. CONCLUSION
Courts ought. to apply strict scrutiny to compulsory education
claims brought under either the first or the fourteenth amendment
to properly protect parents' rights and to render more consistent
decisions. The Supreme Court applies a strict scrutiny framework
when a state infringes on a claimant's right to free exercise of
religion. If state regulations involving compulsory education in-
fringe upon parents' religious beliefs, by analogy, courts ought to
apply strict scrutiny. Assuming that the state interest is compelling,
strict scrutiny analysis limits state action to those regulations that
are the least restrictive alternative to achieving the state interest.
Courts also analyze fundamental rights with a strict scrutiny
framework. The Supreme Court has held that rights similar to
parents' right to guide the education of their children are funda-
mental. The Court has stated in dicta that this right is fundamental
and has consistently reaffirmed its importance. Thus, courts ought
to consider as fundamental parents' right to guide the education of
their children and therefore should analyze an infringement of that
right within the framework of strict scrutiny.
A strict, scrutiny framework applied by all courts will provide
consistency, which is helpful to both parents and the state. Further,
parents' right to guide the education of their children warrants the
protection that strict scrutiny provides. Courts will not arrest the
state interest in education by applying strict scrutiny, but will limit
the state to promulgate only those regulations that are essential. In
light of the interests involved, this is a reasonable compromise.
In addition, the state interest of educating children ought to
remain in basic education, whether or not courts find the state
914 See, e.g., D. HAumoN, supra note 309, at 34.
515 Id. at 42. Harmon notes that, besides a deficiency in education, "[How income, abject
poverty, inadequate housing, work instability, family instability, and membership in a minority
group — especially Black and Hispanic — are other frequent attributes. Illiteracy is almost
always part of an intertwined web of circumstances." Id.
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interest compelling or apply strict scrutiny. The accepted goals of
the state interest in education — successful citizenship and economic
independence — demand no more. States ought first to ensure that
our children are receiving a basic education before discussing the
possibilities of expanding their interest. Finally, a state does not
have a valid interest in ensuring that children can question or choose
their faith. Such an interest would violate the free exercise clause
of the constitution.
Even if courts adopt the strict scrutiny framework there remain
difficulties in determining exactly what requirements a state may
impose on alternative education and in laying out the boundaries
of state and parent interests. Although courts have agreed on some
basic requirements, perhaps, as was suggested in Yoder, school
boards and legislatures are better suited to define these discrete
boundaries.
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